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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
that the act does not validate the conveyance because of
the exact coincidence of grantors and grantees.
The result reached by the decision is desirable, avoid-
ing as it does the adoption of a more cumbersome and ex-
pensive procedure to reach the same result. The court
might better have justified its conclusion, however, by
adopting the reasoning of the dissenting opinion in In re
Klatzl's Estate5 which later became the ruling of the court
by adoption as the majority holding in Boehringer v.
Schmid.8 The New York court avoided the common law
rule requiring distinct and separate grantors by saying that
the grantor did not convey to himself as grantee but to a
unity or en'ity which was composed of the consolidation of
the grantor and another. In Michigan7 the court decided
that the result of a conveyance by the husband to him-
self' and wife jointly was to create a tenancy in common,
treating the grantor husband as having reserved to him-
self a one-half interest in the property. This result was
not intended and should not be the result unless the in-
tended result could not be reached.
The instant case is also novel in that it appears to be
the first case interpreting the Uniform Interparty Act. It
would seem that the act has not had an auspicious in-
augural in the courts.
Harold S. Irwin
INCONTROVERTIBLE PHYSICAL FACTS RULE IN
PENNSYLVANIA
The doctrine of "Incontrovertible Physical Facts", is
one that has received much attention from the courts 6f
Pennsylvania in the past few years. Although fore-
6110 N. E. 181 (N. Y. 1915).
6173 N. E. 220 (N. Y.).
'Wright v. Knapp, 150 N. W. 315 (Mich. 1915).
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shadowed by the cases of Carroll v. Pennsylvania R. R.,1 and
Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co.,' it is but recently that the
doctrine has become a favorite with both bench and bar.
Consequently, its growth and present status are of more
than passing importance.
In his excellent work, "Trial By jury", the former
Chief justice, Mr. Robert Von Moschzisker, deals with the
Carroll' and Lonzerl cases at length. The Chief justice
points out that those great judges, Gibson and Tilghman,
took the position that the trial judge could not under any
circumstances, be called upon to charge that either party
had failed to establish his claim or defense."
Such a position, so restrictive of the power of a trial
court gradually broke down,' and with the decisions in the
Carroll and Lonzer cases a basis Was laid for the present
"Incontrovertible Physical Facts" doctrine, wherein the
pendulum swings far away from the rule advanced by
Gibson and Tilghman.
Thus it becomes necessary td examine these two cele-
brated cases. In Carroll v. Pennsylvania R. R., the plain-
tiff had been struck at a crossing by a railroad train. The
court denied him the right% to have his claim for damages
sent tct the jury, and said that:
"It is, in vairt for a man to say that he looked and
listened, if, in despite of what his eyes and ears must
have told him, he walked directly in front of a mov-
ing locomotive."'
112 W. N. C. 348 (1882).
2196 Pa. 610, 613, 46 At!. 937 (1900).
RMoschzisker, Trial by Jury, sections 319-321.
'Ibid., sections 298-319.
OIbid., section 293, citing Jones v. Wildes, 8 S. & R. 150 and Zerg-
er v. Sailer, 6 Binn. 24.
6Ibid., section 294.
712 W. N. C. 348 (1882).
8Ibid., page 349. See also Schum v. Penna. R. R. 107 Pa. 8,
12, 13; Myers v. B. & 0. R. R., 150 Pa. 386, 390, 24 Atl 747 (1892);
Berstein v. Penna. K. R., 252 Pa. 581, 585, 586, 97 Atl. 033 (1916);
Barton v. Lehigh Valley Transit Company 283 Pa. 577, 580, 129 At.
585 (1925).
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That rule of thumb, the "stop, look and listen" rule was
involved in the Carroll case, and the decision was an appli-
cation of it.
Mr. Justice Mitchell in Lonzer v. Lehigh Railroad Coin-
pany,9 said:
"When the testimony is not in itself improbable, is
not at variance with any proved or admitted facts, or
with ordinary experience, and comes from witnesses
whose candor there is no apparent ground for doubt-
ing, the jury is not at liberty to indulge in a capricious
disbelief; if they do so, it is the duty of the court to
set the verdict aside****and where that is the case, the
court may refuse to submit it at all and direct a ver-
dict accordingly."
With these two cases, particularly the Carroll case, the
groundwork for the doctrine of "incontrovertible physical
facts" was fashioned.
It is with no surprise then, that in Bornscheuer v.
Traction Company,'0 we find Mr. Justice Mitchell stating
that:
"The conclusion is irresistible that the witness was
mistaken as to the distance between him and the car
when he started to cross the track, and the jury should
not have been allowed to believe him."
Mr. Justice Mitchell relied strongly upon the Carroll case.
Not until the learned opinion of Mr. Justice Walling in
the much quoted case of Lessig v. Reading Transit and Light
Co.," ' however, do we find an actual mention of the doctrine
9196 Pa. 610, 613, 46 Atl. 937 (1900).
10198 Pa. 332, 334, 47 Atl. 872 (1901).
11270 Pa, 299, 302, 303, 113 Atl. 381 (1921). For similar rules in
other jurisdictions see: Sheppard v. WicJhita Ice Co., 82 Kan. 509, 28
L. R. A. (NS) 648, 650, 180 Pac. 819 (1910); Hunter v. N. Y. Etc.
Co., 116 N. Y. 615, 6 L. R. A. 246, 23 N. E. 9 (1889); Warn~ke v. Rope
Co., 186 Mo. App. 30, 171. S. W. 643, 21 A. L. R. 144 (1914); Fox v.
LeComte, 2 App. Div. 61, 37 N. Y. S. 316 (1896); aff'd on opinion below
in 153 N. Y. 680, 48 N. E. 1104 (1896); Itvine v. Palmer Mfg. Co., 2
App. Div. 69, 37 N. Y. S. 322, re-argument denied in 3 App. Div. 395, 39
N. Y. S. 245 (1896); Kelly v. Jones 290 Ill. 375, 125 N. E. 334, 8 A. L.
R 792 (1919); B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. O'Neill, 108 C. C, A. 115, 186
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of "inco'ntrovertible physical facts". In his elaborate and
explanatory opinion Mr. Justice Walling states that:
"As a general rule a suitor is entitled to have his
case submitted to the jury on his own interested testi-
mony although contradicted by disinterested witnesses,
the remedy for a perverse verdict being a new trial;
where, however,as here, the party's own testimony
stands not only opposed to that of several disinter-
ested witnesses, but is shown to be untrue by incon-
trovertible physical facts (italics ours), the case is differ-
ent. It is vain for a man to say his auto was struck
in the back when the only injury thereto is at the side
near the front wheel, or to insist the collision was at
one place when the broken glass and! other unmistak-
able evidences thereof are at another. A court cannot
accept as true that which the indisputable evidence
demonstrates is false****(The court then discusses
and relies on the Carroll and Bornscheuer cases)****. In
the present case plaintiff's testimony cannot be ac-
cepted in face of the infallible physical facts. Elliott
on Evidence (sec. 39) says: 'Even though it (an appel-
late court) may not be authorized to weigh evidence
and pass upon the facts, it may and should so use its
judicial notice as to bring about justice. Thus, there
are often undisputed physical facts clearly shown in
evidence, and, by applying to them a well-known law
of nature, of mathematics, or the like, it is demon-
strated beyond controversy that the verdict or finding
is based upon what is untrue and cannot be true. In
such cases it is very generally held that the appellate
court should take judicial notice of the law of nature
or mathematics or quality of matter, or whatever it
may be that rules the case, and apply it as the trial
court should have done'."
Mr. Justice Walling's able treatment of the "incontro-
vertible physical facts" doctrine in the Lessig case, supra,
has been quoted and relied upon in numerous cases since in
Pennsylvania. In the same year, in the case of Hill v. P. R.
T.,12 Mr. Justice Kephart relies upon and quotes from the
Fed. 13 (1913); U. S. v. Sixty Barrels of Wine, 225 Fed. 846 (1915).
See also 21 A L. R. 141, 142, and Elliot on Evidence, Section 39 and
cases there collected.
12271 Pa 232, 114 Atl. 634 (1921).
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Lessig case. The Hill case dealt with an automobile street
car collision and the "incontrovertible physical facts" rule
was applied to a question of comparative speed. To quote
from the opinion:
"It is useless for a person to say, with the auto
going at a rate of eight miles an hour, the street car
could travel three hundred feet while the auto was
traveling ten or twelve feet. A mathematical calcula-
tion will demonstrate the. impossibility of such an as-
sertion on any theory of plaintiff's case as these facts
are developed.
'13
We find Mr. Justice Kephart in the case of Fuher v.
Westmoreland Coal Co.,"4 adequately stating the problem in-
volved, in the following language:
"We have frequently said in cases where the appar-
ent weight of the evidence on a disputed fact was
overwhelming, still, if there was countervailing evi-
dence of it upon which the jury might make a finding,
all the evidence must be for their consideration. The
jury had the undoubted right to weigh the evidence
and pass on the credibility of the witnesses, where
plaintiff's evidence, standing alone, would justify the
inferences necessary to support his claim. When the
trial court passes on the weight of the evidence, giv-
ing judgment therefrom, it substitutes the judge for
the jury as the tryer of facts. If the jury's verdict is
against the weight of the evidence a new trial should
be granted, and, when manifestly so, as often as the
court, in all conscience, should deem it necessary.
Under our jurisprudence this is the only corrective
remedy for a perverse verdict.
"Exceptions to this rule have been, made in cases
where testimony stands opposed to physical facts ad-
mitted or the evidence thereof is of such conclusive and
unimpeachable nature as to amount to an admission.
While an appellate court may not be authorized to
weigh evidence and pass upon disputed facts, it should
use its judicial knowledge to bring about justice, and,
where undisputed physical facts are clearly shown and
it is demonstrated by the law of nature, by mathe-
matics or the like, that a finding is untrue and cannot
18Ibid., pp. 236, 237.
16272 Pa. 14, 166 AtL 61 (1922),
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be true, the appellate court is justified in reversing the
trial court: Lessig v. Transit & Light Co., 270 Pa. 299,
302, 303; Hill v. P. R. T.,271 Pa. 232."
The instant case was held not to be governed by the "in-
controvertible physical facts" rule.
An unusual application of the doctrine is found in the
case of Seiwell v. Director General,15 wherein the court re-
jected as incredible and contrary to human experience and
the laws of nature, testimony that the suction of a rapidly
passing train drew against it an automobile standing at
rest with brakes on, on a grade below that of the tracks.
In Horen v. Director General,16 Mr. Justice Schaffer ap-
plied the doctrine of "incontrovertible physical facts". It
was held that a verdict for plaintiff will be reversed where
it appears that defendant claims that plaintiff, a boy of ten,
was injured while stealing a ride, while evidence, uncon-
tradicted by plaintiffs, shows that he was picked up within
a very few seconds after the injury, not on the railroad
crossing, but thirty to forty-five feet from it on the right
of way, without any evidence of injuries on his body other
than a severance of his leg, and without marks on the track,
showing that he had been dragged or marks on the engine
showing blood, it being manifest that if he had been struck
by the locomotive at the crossing, his body would have
borne marks of serious injury on other parts of it.
An echo, of the Carroll case, supra, is found in the fol-
lowing excerpt from the opinion in the case of Hazlett v.
Director General,)' a railroad crossing case:
"It is in vain to say the traveler stopped, looked
and listened if, in spite of what his eyes and ears must
have, told him, he walked or drove right in front of an
approaching train and was immediately struck."
The court in the case of Cubitt v. N. Y. Central R. R.
Co.,"8 states the doctrine in this manner:
15273 Pa. 259, 116 Atd. 919, 21 A. L. R. 139 (1922).
16274 Pa. 244, 118 AtI. 22 (1922).
17274 Pa. 433, 118 AtI. 367 (1922).
18278 Pa. 366, 123 AtI. 308 (1924).
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"If oral evidence is shown by proved physical facts
to be untrue, the former must be disregarded: Lessig v.
Reading L. & T. Co., 270 Pa. 299; Chapman v. Clothier,
274 Pa. 394. Likewise a presumed fact falls in the face
of incontrovertible testimony to the contrary, given by
witnesses, or derived from proof of the attending cir-
cumstances: Hazlett v. Director General, 274 Pa. 433.
It is urged, however, that in all such cases the jury
must pass on the question, and, when the credibility of
witnesses is above involved, this statement of the legal
rule is correct: Holzheiner v. Lit Bros., 262 Pa. 150;
Shaughnessy v. Director General, 274 Pa. 413. But where
the indisputable physical testimony, as indicated by
actual measurements, maps, or photographs, negatives
the existence of the fact ordinarily presumed, this is
not true: Hill v. P. R. T., 271 Pa. 232; Seiwell v. Hines,
273 Pa. 259."
Where, in the case of Radziemenski v. B. & 0. R. R.
Co., 19 plaintiff's witnesses testified that decedent's view of
defendant's railroad crossing was obstructed by watch-
man's house and a telegraph pole, but an accurate map
showed that these objects could not have obstructed his
view, the court said:
"Yet we are not required to believe what physical
facts demonstrate to be untrue, and when an infallible
mathematical test is applied to the testimony of a wit-
ness and he is found to be mistaken in a material mat-
ter, it would be a travesty on justice to allow the jury
to believe such testimony and permit them to render
a verdict based thereon: Lessig v. Reading Transit Co.,
270 Pa. 299."
The present Chief Justice in Mills v. Pennsylvania R.
R.' ° recognized the "incontrovertible physical facts" rule,
but held that the facts of the railroad crossing collision
case were such that the rule was not applicable, the case
being one for the jury. An automobile had stopped six
feet from the first rail of a double track railroad and the
19283 Pa. 182, 128 Atl. 735 (1925). For a similar approval of the
Lessig case, supra, see Maue v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 284 Pa. 599, 131
AtI. 475 (1925). See also Zandras v. Moffett, 286 Pa. 477, 133 Atl. 817,
47 A. L. R. 699 (1926).
20284 Pa. 605, 131 Atl. 494 (1925).
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occupants had looked and listened. It was possible that
the train appeared in sight after the stop and struck the
car when it had almost cleared the second track. In view
of these facts it was held that:
"A precise timing of the relative movements of
the truck and train and close calculation of time and
space, at best only an approximation, make the margin
of safety such a narrow one that a traveler should
not be held accountable, as a matter of law, for the
resulting accident."
'21
Thus where the question to be determined is one of
speed and distance, if the mathematical calculation involved
is a close one, the court will not apply the "incontrovertible
physical facts" rule; however, where, as in the case of
Hill v. P. R. T., supra, there is considerable discrepancy be-
tween the mathematical calculation of speed and the testi-
mony of the witnesses, the "incontrovertible physical facts"
doctrine will prevail.
It is to be noted that the rule that evidence which con-
tradicts "inconvertible physical facts" cannot alone be made
a basis for sustaining a verdict, has no relevancy where the
testimony of witnesses is needed in order to apply those
facts to the issue in the case. The cases of Scalet v. Bell
Telephone Co.,22 and Pfeffer v. Johnstown,23 exemplify such a
situation.
In an action by a workman for personal injuries alleged
to have been caused by the negligent operation of a hoist
in the construction of a building, the court in Alack v. U. S.
Gypsum Co., 24 said:
"Taking into consideration the physical facts
which plaintiff describes, it was impossible for the
accident to have occurred in the manner alleged."' 5
2l]bid. p. 608.
22291 Pa. 451, 456, 140 Att. 141 (1928).
23287 Pa. 370, 135 Atl. 127 (1926).
24288 Pa. 9, 135 Atl. 623 (1927).
25Ibid., p. 10. For an application of the same rule see: Lamp v.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 305 Pa. 520, 158 Ati. 269 (1931), wherein the
court applied the incontrovertible physical facts rule to a case where
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A line of cases has enunciated the proposition that if
the uncontradicted external facts show that deceased, killed
at a grade crossing, did not stop, look and listen, the ques-
tion is not one for the jury, and the indisputable physical
conditions, indicated by measurements, maps or photo-
graphs, may be resorted to in determining the true situa-
tion.2 0
Although as a general rule a suitor, is entitled to have
his case submitted to the jury on his owrv interested testi-
mony, although contradicted by disinterested witnesses;
where the party's own testimony stands not only opposed
to that of several disinterested witnesses, but also is shown
to be untrue by incontrovertible physical facts, the case
should not be submitted to the jury.
27
In Miller v. Pennsylvania. R. R. Co.,2 8 the late Mr. Justice
Sadler states:
"At the point first mentioned, she (plaintiff) stated
her ability tc6 see for 125 feet, and at 10 feet from the
a motorist was killed in a railroac crossing collision and at page 270
held that "testimony of plaintiff's witnesses contradictory of in-
fallible physical facts cannot be accepted". In Folger v. Pittsburgh
Rys. Co., 291 Pa. 205, 139 Atl. 858 (1927), it was held -that id an ac-
tion against a street railway company for damages for personal in-
juries suffered in a collision between a trolley car and plaintiff's
automobile, a judgment for defendant N.O.V. is properly entered
where it appears that it was physically impossible for the accident to
'have happened in the manner described by plaintiff and her wit-
nesses. See also: Griffiths v. Lehigh Val. Transit Co., 292 Pa. 489,
493, 494, 14L Atl. 300 (1928); Amey v. Erb, 296 Pal' 561, 566, 146 Atl.
141 (1929) ; Carlo v. Bessemer & Lakes Erie R. R. Co.4 293 Pa. 343,
143 Ati. 3 (1928), 278 U. S. 622, 73 L. Ed. 543, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25;
Sharp v. P. R. T., 103 Pa. Super. Ct. 357 (1931), which follows rule
of Lessig and Carroll cases in dealing with an automobile-street car
collision; Hartig v. Ice Co., 290 Pa. 21, 137 At]. 867 (1927).
26Grimes v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 289 Pa. 320, 137 AtL 451,
(1927); Weber v. P. & W. Va. Ry., 300 Pa. 351, 354, 150 Atl. 624
(1930); Perucca v. B. & 0. R. Co., Contrell et ux v. Same, 35 F. (2d)
113, 114 (1929).
27 Haskins v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 293 Pa. 537, 143 Ati. 192
(1928) ; Joseph v. P. & W. Va. Ry., 294 Pa. 315,422, 144 AtI. 139 (1928);
Lunzer v. P. & L. E. R. R., 296 Pa. 393, 398, 399, 145 AtI. 907 (1929).
29299 Pa. 63, 67, 149 Atl. 85 (1930).
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track where the next obstruction was made, 300 feet,
but saw no train on either occasion. In so declaring,
she must be in error, for both photographs and actual
measurements disclose that an unobstructed view to
the south for 4,150 feet could have been had when she
had reached the east line of the station, the second
place where she looked. 'While it is not within the
province of this court to decide disputed questions of
fact, and we are bound to give the plaintiff the benefit
of all favorable inferences which may be drawn from
the testimony, yet we are not required to believe what
physical facts demonstate to be untrue'."
Where, in Snyder v. Penn Liberty Refining Co., 9 a truck
struck the linoleum which a minor was carrying across a
street, thereby injuring him, it was held that:
"The position of a moving object (such as a truck)
that causes the injury, as shown by certain evidence,
cannot be called an 'incontrovertible physical fact',
when other evidence or inferences therefrom show the
position of the object to be elsewhere at the time of
the accident."
The rule of the Snyder case, supra, was applied to a
moving street car in Schaeffer v. Reading Transit Company."0
In delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice Kephart
states:
"Appellant insists that the 'incontrovertible phys-
ical facts' rule must govern this case. It attempts to
invoke this rule to show that the trolley car was not
250 feet away when appellee turned in. We said, in
Snyder v. Penn Liberty Refining Co., 302 Pa. 320, 'The
position of a moving object that causes the injury, as
shown by, certain' evidence, cannot be called an incon-
trovertible physical fact when****other evidence shows
the position of the object to be elsewhere at the time
of the accident.' The facts which appellant contends
are fixed are only estimates. Appellee may have been
going faster than he thought or appellant may have
been going slower. Moreover, appellant fails to work
into the mathematical test its duty to reduce its' speed
29302 Pa. 320, 322, 323, 153 Atd. 549 (1930). See also Hegarty et
ux v. Berger, 304 Pa. 221, 226, 227, 155 Atl. 484 (1931).
30302 Pa. 220, 153 Atd. 323 (1931).
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when appellee went on the tracks. The 'incontro-
vertible physical facts' rule has no application."
In the case of Hegarty et ux. v. Berger,31 which was an
action by pedestrians against the driver of an automobile
which forced a second automobile onto a pavement as a
result of a right hand collision, thereby injuring plaintiffs,
the court held:
"There is no merit in appellant's contention that
plaintiffs' case is disproved by the incontrovertible
physical facts. The record presents no such facts.
They are never established by oral evidence as to the
position, speed, etc., of movable objects: Schaeffer v.
Reading Transit Co., 302 Pa. 320; Snyder v.Penn Liberty
Refining Co., 302 Pa. 320; Scalet v. Bell Telephone Co.,
291 Pa. 451. It was far from physically impossible that
the accident happened as described by plaintiffs' wit-
nesses."
Where there was a collision at an intersection between
a street car and an automobile, and indisputable evidence
showed that the testimony of the driver of the automobile
in which plaintiff was a passenger as to the distance be-
tween the automobile and the street car was intentionally
or mistakenly false, it was held in Lits v. P. R. T. Co., 2 that
it was the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury to dis-
regard it.
Fontaine et ux v. Pittsburgh, Mars & Butler Ry. Com-
pany,38 dealt with a collision between an automobile and a
street car. The plaintiff claimed he had been blinded by
the bright headlight on the street car. After reviewing
physical facts relating to the street car's position and the
roadway alongside which was inside of a curve and the
outside of which was the street car track, and since the
street car and automobile were traveling in opposite direc-
tions, the Superior Court ruled that in such a case, the
rays of the headlight moved forward in a straight course
outside of the curve and if plaintiffs had continued to travel
1304 Pa. 221, 155 At. 436 (1931).
3297 Pa. Super. Ct. 344 (1929).
3891 Pa. Super. Ct. 95 (1927).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
on the paved surface of the road on the inside of the curve
they could not have been blinded by the glare of the head-
light.
In the case of Zimmer v. Clark,"4 wherein a child
who was struck by defendant's car at a street crossing sued
for personal injuries, evidence of the position of defend-
ant's automobile when it struck the child was held not to
be of such character as to justify the application of the
"incontrovertible physical facts" rule where the evidence
was conflicting, such rule not applying where the position
or speed of the moving object is dependent on oral testi-
mony.
Chief Justice Frazer in Vlasich v. B. & 0. Co., 8 held
that where plaintiff's decedent was killed when struck by
a train after alighting from his automobile which had stal-
led upon a grade crossing, it was error for the lower court
to enter judgment for defendant N.O.V., on the basis of
alleged infallible mathematical calculation, where it did
not clearly appear from the evidence for what length of time
the automobile was stalled upon the tracks, and possibly
it was stopped sufficiently long for the train to have come
into view after decedent started to make the crossing.
An excerpt from the case of Keinske v. City of Philadel-
phia,' 6 states the following:
"If the plaintiff's case rested on the testimony of
the first witness and it went to a jury, a verdict for
the plaintiff would have to be set aside because of the
'incontrovertible physical facts' which show that the
accident could not have taken place the way he testi-
fied it did; that is to say, a three and a half ton girder,
34103 Pa. Super, Ct. 145, 146 (1931).
35March Term, 1932, No. 44, Pa. Supreme Ct. (C. P. Allegheny
County, April Term, 1930, No. 939-reversed).
8613 D. & C. (Pa. 1929). In Godshal v. Dietrich, 13 D. & C. 452
(1929), it was held that where in a suit for damages arising out of a
collision between two motor cars at an intersection, the verdict of
the jury is in favor of the plaintiff, but the mathematical test applied
to the plaintiff's testimony as to the speed of both cars prior to the
collision, makes it appear that testimony is so untrustworthy as to
be insufficient to support the verdict, a new trial will be granted.
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blocked and lashed down to a truck, could not be com-
pletely torn away from its fastenings and thrown off
the truck because a wheel of the truck went into a
one-foot depression in a road while the truck was pro-
ceeding at a slow rate of speed. Courts are not re-
quired to believe, that which is contrary to human ex-
perience and the laws of nature, or that which they
know to be incredible."
In Young v. Gill" the Pennsylvania Superior Court held
that the trial court should instruct jury to disregard testi-
mony that automobile hit truck, proved to be false by pho-
tographs showing that truck must have run into the side of
the automobile.
From the cases as outlined, the following might be laid
down:
(1) The doctrine of "incontrovertible physical
facts", that the courts cannot accept as true that which
a well known law of nature, of mathematics, or the
like, demonstrate beyond controversy to be untrue, is
applied considerably in Pennsylvania.
(2) Where the question to be determined is one
of speed and distance, if the mathematical calculation
involved is a close one, the courts will not apply the
rule.
(3) Where a party's own testimony stands not
only opposed to that of several disinterested witnesses,
but also is shown to be untrue by incontrovertible
physical facts, the case should not be submitted to the
jury.
The query still remains, however, as to what is an
incontrovertible fact. In the field of mathematics the doc-
trine can be applied with some degree of assurance, but
where reliance is placed on a photograph there is consid-
erable question. The recent Olympic Games demonstrated
how the sight of eye and camera can vary. The same un-
certainty applies to our accepted laws of physics.
87103 Pa. Super. Ct. 467, 157 Atl. 348 (1931), as to a clear: view
calculation see Haller v. P. R., 306 Pa. 98, 106 (1932).
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It is for these reasons that incontrovertible physical
facts should be supported by some means of credible evi-
dence as pointed out in (3) above.
Nicholas Unkovic
VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS LIMITING LIABILITY
FOR NEGLIGENCE AS BETWEEN PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS
The decisions of -Pennsylvania as to contracts gen-
erally which limit liability for negligence are apparently
much in conflict. The law is well settled that carriers and
innkeepers cannot so contract., The reason is sound.
These are businesses so affected with a public interest that
the protection of public safety and of public property
demand this safeguard. The individual does not deal with
them on a basis of equality. Use of them is oftentimes a
necessity. Consequently, he cannot afford to haggle. He
prefers rather to accept any terms, often indeed (especially
where the contract is created by notice) without knowing
what contract he does make.
Where railroads have contracted, however, not in their
character as common carriers but as individuals, a differ-
ent conclusion has been reached. Thus, contracts by a
railroad not to be held liable for fires negligently caused on
premi-ses leased to individuals along the right of way or
along purely private sidings, have been upheld,2 on the
ground that "the railroad owes no duty to the public in
connection therewith". 3
A similar result was reached where mining companies
contracted not to be held liable for collapse of surface sup-
'Grogan v. Express Co., 114 Pa. 523 (1887); Express Co. v. Sands,
55 Pa. 140 (1867); Hoyt v. Clinton Hotel Co., 35 Pa. Super Ct. 97
(1907).
2Rundall & Co. v. R. R. Co., 254 Pa. 529 (1916); Stoneboro v. R.
R. Co., 238 Pa. 289 (1912).
gStoneboro v. R. R. Co., 238 Pa. 289 (1912).
